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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS, : Category No. 13 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" test with rule 
11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which supersedes the 
"record as a whole" test traditionally applied on review to 
determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
entered. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on September 
14, 1990, and appears in State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
(Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990) (a copy of the court's opinion is 
contained in the addendum). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with retail theft, a third degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989). On the 
day of trial, defendant pled guilty as charged and was sentenced 
immediately thereafter by Judge Richard H. Moffat to serve a term 
of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison. 
Directly after sentence was imposed, defendant moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea and requested that he proceed to trial. 
Defendant's attorney stated that unless his client received some 
sort of concession for pleading guilty as charged, it was a 
disservice to his client to not go to trial. Judge Moffat 
granted defendant's motion and set trial for the next day. 
The following day, Judge Moffat reconsidered 
defendant's motion and found that defendant's disappointment with 
his sentence was not "good cause" to allow defendant to renege on 
his guilty plea (T. 19). Defendant's sentence as previously 
imposed was allowed to stand (T. 19-20). On appeal, the court of 
appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded the case to allow 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 38. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes is not 
necessary for purposes of this petition. The relevant facts are 
those stated above in the Statement of the Case. 
The facts underlying the charges against defendant are 
accurately summarized in the court of appeals' opinion. Pharris, 
143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT 
STATE V, GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987), 
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST 
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant argued, 
inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because "the trial court 
failed to inform him of (1) his right against self incrimination; 
(2) the nature and elements of the offense; and (3) the possible 
penalties which might be imposed." State v. Pharris, 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 35. The State responded that, under the "record as 
a whole" test traditionally applied by this Court in reviewing 
the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see, e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 
784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990); 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller, 
718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), the trial court had 
2 
not abused its discretion. 
In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals definitively 
rejected the State's argument that the "record as a whole" test 
The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows: 
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is 
not critical so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving. 
718 P.2d at 405. 
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applied, concluding that in State v. Gibbons, this Court 
"announced that strict compliance was required under Rule 11(5) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when defendant's entered 
guilty pleas". Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. In sum, the 
court of appeals ruled that if the trial court has not strictly 
complied with rule 11(5), the guilty plea, although perhaps 
otherwise voluntary, must automatically be vacated. This 
conclusion misconstrues Gibbons and ignores significant language 
in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons opinions of this Court that 
clearly cuts against the notion that Gibbons abandoned the record 
as a whole test for determining the voluntariness, and thus 
3 
validity, of a guilty plea. 
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the 
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the 
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on 
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the 
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that 
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in 
all trial courts in this state is appropriate." Gibbons, 740 
P. 2d at 1312. It then set out the specific requirements for 
taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting 
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the 
defendant's pleas. Ibid. The Gibbons Court did not even mention 
the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a 
The State has also petitioned this Court for review on 
identical grounds in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. 
App. August 24, 1990). 
guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious: the Court was not 
reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness 
of the defendant's pleas. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict 
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons. The Gibbons 
Court simply did not address that issue. 
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a 
whole test was not modified by Gibbons. For example, in Jolivet 
v. Cook/ this Court stated: 
We first address Jolivet's claim that his 
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. 
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns 
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas 
because he did not make findings that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
ar.d how those elements related ~c the facts, 
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he 
did not know or understand these things when 
he entered his pleas. 
[Rule 11(5) (d)] requires that- before a 
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must 
find that the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons, 
this Court stated that in making this 
finding, the trial court must ensure that the 
defendant understands "the elements of the 
crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In 
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that 
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea, 
it must find that the defendant knows of the 
possibility of- the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The record clearly shows that at 
the time the guilty pleas were accepted, 
Judge Burns did not make the findings 
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how these elements related to the facts 
-5-
and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. 
However, this Court has held, M[T]he absence 
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted). And in State v. 
Copeland, the Court, without citing Gibbons, said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him.M 
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173 
(emphasis in the original). We think the 
most effective way to do this is to have the 
defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the action 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. ThQ test is 
voluntariness. We hold that the record 
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts 
sufficient to justify his conviction of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons 
guilty pleas, Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, this Court did 
not note or attach any significance to that fact in either 
opinion, and, in fact, directly applied Gibbons in Jolivet in 
concluding that although the trial court did not strictly comply 
with rule 11, the record as a whole demonstrated that Jolivet 
-6-
entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Jolivet, 784 
P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously undermines the court of appeals' 
effort to distinguish Jolivet and Copeland on the basis that the 
record as a whole test was applied in those cases because they 
4 
involved pre-Gibbons guilty pleas. Significantly, in State v. 
Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), which involved a post-Gibbons 
guilty plea, this Court appeared to apply the record as a whole 
test in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
5 
motion to withdraw. 
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the 
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction 
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the 
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986): 
A final word on the Scate's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position was shortsighted, for to follow 
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong. If we were to hold any 
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before 
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined 
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that 
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would 
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672 
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of 
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet 
and should not be followed. 
5 
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of 
Smith, having stated directly in the instant case that Smith 
applied the "strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons." 
Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38 n.6. 
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violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendant's, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their 
convictions for purely tactical reasons, 
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas 
corpus long after the fact. We have refused 
to overturn convictions upon such challenges 
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah, 
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no 
reason to encourage such attacks in the 
future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical, if not 
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more than technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
717 : 2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . This view is consistent 
with the harmless error rule long recognized by this Court in a 
variety of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071 
(Utah 1989) (harmless error standard for nonconstitutional 
error); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with 
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than 
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See, 
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir.~1990) 
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does 
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived 
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App, 179, 378 
S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989.) (where defendant was otherwise 
informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is applied to 
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of 
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781, 
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole" demonstrated that plea 
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined 
by considering all relevent circumstances surrounding it, not by 
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived). 
respect to certain constitutional errors, we must place on the 
State the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt"). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Interestingly, the court of 
appeals did not so much as mention Kay, even though the State 
cited the foregoing quoted language from Kay to it in its brief. 
See State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, Br. of Appellee at 10. 
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's 
pre-and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a 
whole test with a strict compliance test. A strict compliance 
test is not required either by Gibbons or logic. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because 
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law 
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(b). Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on 
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in 
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court 
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should 
be settled by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition 
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this cfayof October, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
_q_ DAN R. LARSEN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to James A. 
Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, t h i s / 3 - — 
day of October, 1990. 
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IN THL 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATF of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Frank Edward PHARRIS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. S90549-CA 
FILED- September 14, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake Countv 
The Honorable Richard H Moffat 
ATTORNEY S 
James A Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt 
Lake Cit>, for Appellant 
R Paul Van Dam and Dan R Larsen, Salt 
Lake Cit\, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Newev ' 
BILLINGS, Judge. 
Defendant Frank Edward Pharns appeals 
his conviction of retail theft, a third degree 
felon\, in violation of Utah Code Ann §76 
6-602(1) (1989) We vacate the conviction 
and remand 
Defendant was accused of taking a VCR 
from a Sears store without paving for it 
Police arrested defendant in the store parking 
lot with the VCR in his possession 
Defendant's trial was set for August 8, 
1989 On the da> of trial, defendant agreed to 
enter a guilty plea if the State would not 
oppose a motion that defendant be sentenced 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann §76-6-
412(1 )(c) (1989), for a class A misdemeanor 
At the change of plea hearing, the trial 
judge asked defendant whether he had gone 
over his statement with his attorney, whether 
he was under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, whether he understood the English 
language, whether he was threatened or pro 
mised anything other than the plea bargain 
itself, and whether he was acting freely and of 
his own volition 
The judge then told defendant he was enti-
tled to certain constitutional protections incl-
uding the right to trial by a jury, the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the 
nght to require the State to prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and "other valu-
able constitutional rights " Defendant said he 
understood his waiver of those rights by ple-
ading guilty and was willing to do so 
The judge asked defendant if he had any 
questions of the court or of his attorney 
Defendant responded, "No" The judge asked 
if defendant knew the allowable penalties for a 
third degree felony and whether his attorney 
had discussed those penalties with him Defe 
ndant answered, "Yes " The judge told defe 
ndant the court was not bound by the reco 
mmendations of the plea bargain and the 
court could impose anv sentence either cone 
urrently or consecutively with the sentence 
defendant was presently serving 
Defendant entered a plea of guiltv which the 
judge declared was entered voluntanlv and 
knowingly Defendant waived the two-dav 
minimum time for sentencing and asked to be 
sentenced immediately Defense counsel asked 
the court to impose sentence as a class A 
misdemeanor The prosecutor did not oppose 
defense counsel's request but described defe 
ndant's extensive criminal record The judge 
denied defendant's motion to reduce the 
offense one degree and sentenced defendant to 
serve zero to five years concurrently with the 
sentence he was presently serving 
Defendant immediately moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea and asked to proceed to trial 
Defense counsel argued that unless his client 
received some concession in the sentence, it 
would be a disservice to him not to go to trial 
The judge granted the motion and set trial for 
the next day 
The next morning, the judge reversed his 
decision granting the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea, explaining that a showing of 
"good cause" was required The judge then 
gave defendant an opportunity to show good 
cause as to whv his plea should be withdrawn 
In response, defense counsel explained the 
State had not opposed the reduction of defe 
ndant's sentenLe to a class A misdemeanor 
He pointed to the length of time defendant 
had been incarcerated since his arrest and the 
circumstances surrounding defendant's release 
on another conviction and his subsequent 
arrest Defense counsel also mentioned that he 
had ineffectively represented defendant by 
indicating that the plea bargain had a good 
chance of success In response, the prosecutor 
again outlined portions of defendant's prior 
criminal record 
The judge noted he had informed defendant 
before the guilty plea was entered that the 
recommendations as to the sentence were not 
binding on the court and defendant's disap 
pomtment with the sentence did not establish 
good cause for withdrawal of the plea The 
judge ultimately reimposed the sentence 
Among other claims on appeal,2 defendant 
asserts the trial judge failed to comply with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proc-
edure as required by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), when accepting his guilty plea Defen-
dant contends the trial court failed to inform 
him of (1) his right against self-
incrimination, (2) the nature and elements of 
the offense, and (3) the possible penalties 
which might be imposed The State on appeal 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
does not contend the trial court's questioning 
of defendant complies with the Gibbons strict 
compliance lest, but rather responds that 
appellate court decisions subsequent to Gibbons 
have abandoned the strict compliance 
standard and allow application of the prior 
'record as a whole" test to determine whether 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered 
his guilty plea. The State further asserts that, 
At the hearing before the trial judge, defendant 
did not articulate as a ground for withdrawal 
of his plea that the court failed to comply with 
Rule 11 and thus defendant cannot raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
CONSIDERING VOLUNTARINESS OF 
GUILTY PLEA FOR FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11 
challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be 
considered for the first time on appeal. *[IJn 
certain cases we may consider the failure to 
comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error 
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be 
first raised on appeal to this court." Stste v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (per curiam).3 See also State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (defendant 
had not moved to withdraw guilty plea and 
court remanded to the trial court to allow a 
withdrawal motion while retaining jurisdiction 
over the case). 
The Valencia court relied on the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the 
Court found no error when the Alabama 
Supreme Court, on its own motion, dealt with 
the constitutionality of a guilty plea. Id. at 
240. The Court stated that "[ijt was error, 
plain on the face of the record, for the trial 
judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without 
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent 
and voluntary. Id. at 242.4 
Although we acknowledge that the trial 
judge made a greater effort to ensure that 
defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowi-
ngly given than in Valencia and Boykin, 
because of the fundamental rights involved, 
we conclude the trial court's deficiencies in 
determining whether the guilty plea was 
entered knowingly and voluntarily constitute 
plain error.5 We therefore will address this 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
RULE 11 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure sets out findings a court must make 
before accepting a guilty plea. Rule 11(5) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
The court may refuse to accept a 
plea of guilty or no contest, and 
may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
Phanis CODE^CO 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the 
nature and dements of the offense 
to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elem-
ents; 
(e) the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for 
each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sent-
ences; 
UtahR.Crim. P. 11(5). 
Prior to 1987, the Utah Supreme Court did 
not require strict compliance with Rule 11. 
The court had concluded that a guilty plea 
may be upheld if "the record as a whole affi-
rmatively establishes that defendant entered 
his plea with full knowledge and understan-
ding of its consequences/ Warner v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) (mem.); see also 
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). This "record as a 
whole" test was later reaffirmed in Srare v. 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam). 
In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court rejected 
the "record as a whole" test. In State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court announced that strict compli-
ance was required under Rule 11(5) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when def-
endants entered guilty pleas. Id. at 1314. In Gib-
bons, the trial judge, in accepting 
Gibbons' guilty plea, informed him of the 
penalties for the crimes, the constitutional 
rights he waived as articulated in Rule 11, the 
possible sentences for the crimes, and the 
possibility that those sentences could run 
concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 1311. 
However, the trial judge failed to inform 
Gibbons of the elements of the crimes. Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court remanded Gibbon's 
appeal of his guilty plea because he had not 
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, thereby 
I depriving the trial court of the opportunity to 
I address the error, but articulated its concern 
that the plea was not properly taken as defe-
ndant had not been adequately informed of 
I the elements of the offense to which he pled. Id. 
at 1311. 
I The Utah Supreme Court in Gibbons took 
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ike opportunity to articulate the requirements 
for accepting guilty pleas. The court noted the 
trial court's burden to comply with the Rule 
11 requirements: 
Because of the importance of 
compliance with Rule 11(e) (new 
Rule 11(5)] and Boykin, UJC law 
places the burden of establishing 
compliance with those requirements 
on the trial judge. It is not suffic-
ient to assume that defense attor-
neys make sure that their clients 
fully understand the contents of the 
affidavit. 
The use of a sufficient affidavit 
can promote efficiency, but an 
affidavit should be only a starting 
point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process. 
Jd. at 1313. 
The court found that a "sufficient affidavit" 
should contain the following elements: (1) a 
list of the names and the degrees of the crimes 
charged; (2) a statement of the elements of the 
offenses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts 
that establish the elements of the crimes 
charged; (4) the allowable punishment for the 
crimes charged and note the possibility of 
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes; (5) 
the rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea; 
(6) the details of any plea bargain with a dis-
claimer that any sentencing recommendations 
may not be followed; (7) the defendant's 
ability to read and understand the English 
language; (8) the defendant's competency; and 
(9) the absence of any inducements to influ-
ence defendant's plea. Id. at 1313-14. The 
court concluded that *[t]he trial judge should 
then review the statements in the affidavit with 
the defendant, question the defendant conce-
rning his understanding of it, and fulfill the 
other requirements imposed by [Rule 11] on 
the record before accepting the guilty plea." Id. 
at !314 (emphasis added). 
The Gibbons standard was acknowledged by 
this court in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), where we reiterated 
the rule that: 
[t]rial courts may not rely on 
defense counsel or executed affid-
avits to satisfy the specific require-
ments of Rule 11(e). [Gibbons, 740 
P.2d] at 1313. Rather,. with or 
without an affidavit or defense 
counsel's advice, the trial court 
must conduct an on-the-record 
review with defendant of the Rule 
11(e) requirements. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94 (quoting Gib-
bons, 740 P.2d at 1314)). However, in 
Vasilacopulos, the defendant's guilty plea was 
entered prior to Gibbons and thus the court 
applied the previous 'record as a whole" test. 
Recently in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we clearly held 
that the Gibbons ttrict compliance test is 
controlling. Id. at 28. 
Other opinions have likewise stated the test 
for determining whether Rule 11 has been 
followed is the strict compliance test articul-
ated in Gibbons. See State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 
464, 465 (Utah 1989)*; State v. Valencia, 776 
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per 
curiam)7. 
The State relies on Johvet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 
S. Ct. 751 (1990),« and Stare v. Copeland, 765 
P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988),* to support its 
argument that the Utah Supreme Court has 
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test. 
However, we assume that the court applied the 
"record as a whole" test in these cases because 
the guilty pleas in both cases were entered 
before the Gibbons decision.* 
The State also argues that this court has 
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test as 
well in Stare v. Thursron, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). However, Thurston is not on 
point and the State is mistaken in its reliance 
on this case. In Thurston, the defendant 
argued the State had not kept its part of the 
plea agreement as to the recommendation that 
defendant receive probation and thus defen-
dant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea because of this failure. Id. at 1301. The 
issue was not whether the trial court failed to 
comply with Rule 11 in determining whether 
the plea was knowing and voluntary. As the 
court explained: 
The record here establishes that 
defendant .was fully informed of his 
rights and the consequences of his 
guilty plea. 
The judge, pursuant to Rule 11, 
informed defendant of his rights to 
t r i a l a n d a g a i n s t s e1f -
incrimination, and related to him 
the potential consequences of his 
guilty plea. 
Id. at 1302. 
In summary, we find the Gibbons strict 
compliance test is applicable to this post-
Gibbons guilty plea. In reviewing the trial 
court's inquiry into the voluntariness of def-
endant's plea, we find the trial judge did not 
review with the defendant in court on the 
record three of the requirements of Rule 11. 
First, the trial court did not as required by 
Rule ll(5Xc) inform defendant at the time the 
plea was taken that he waived his constituti-
onal right against self-incrimination by ple-
ading guilty to the offense. The State argues 
that this information is included in the affid-
avit. However, inclusion in the affidavit alone 
is not sufficient to ensure that the defendant's 
constitutional rights are protected. See 
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Next, the trial court made ao inquiry on the 
ptcord concerning defendant's understanding 
of the nature and elements of the offense as 
required by Rule M(5Xd). The State «rfues 
that the nature and elements of the offense of 
retail theft were explained at defendant's 
preliminary hearing. However, the preliminary 
hearing transcript is not before us and thus it 
is impoctible for us to make this determina-
tion. Again, this information is only in the 
affidavit and, as we have explained, that alone 
k insufficient. Failure to inform a defendant 
of the nature and elements of the offense is 
fatal to a guilty plea conviction. See Gibbons, 
740 PJ2d at 1314." See also Valencia, 776 
P.2d 1332,1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Finally, the trial court failed to review the 
possible punishment with defendant as requ-
ired by Rule ll(5Xe). The record reflects the 
following dialogue between the defendant and 
the trial court on the issue of penalties: 
Q [THE COURTJ: Are you aware of the 
possible penalties that can be imposed for a 
Third Degree Felony? Has your attorney told 
you what the possible penalties are? 
A [DEFENDANT): Yes. 
Utah courts have found the failure to 
inform a defendant of the punishments poss-
ible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction.12 See 
Smith, 777 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (court 
reversed because record did not show defen-
dant was informed of the minimum manda-
tory sentence which would be imposed); Vas-
ilicopulos, 756 P.2d at 95 (in a pre-Gibbons 
plea, the court reversed after finding the def-
endant did not understand the possibility of 
consecutive sentences).13 
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test, 
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court 
must review on the record with the defendant 
at the time the plea is taken the nature and 
elements of the offense, the constitutional 
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives 
by pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties. 
We find that the trial court failed to strictly 
comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons and thus we 
vacate defendant's conviction and remand to 
the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Robert L. Newey, Judge 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (1990). 
2. Defendant also claims that (1) the prosecutor 
failed to comply with the plea agreement; (2) the 
court erred in reversing its prior order granting 
withdrawal of the plea; (3) there was 'good cause' 
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea; and 
(4) defendant's sentence was based on material 
misinformation. Because we reverse on defendant's 
Ptarrte CODE^CO 
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Rule 11 claim, we do not reach the other issues 
presented on appeal. 
3. In Vmkocia, the defendant was asked two quest-
ions at the time the guilty plea was entered: (1) 
whether defendant "understood his affidavit;' and 
(2) whether his plea was "voluntary." Valencia, 776 
P.2d at 1334. The court found that the guilty plea 
was not entered in compliance with Rule 11(5) or 
with Gibbons and summarily reverted and remanded 
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and 
proceed to trial. Vaiencta, 776 P.2d at 1334. 
4. In Boykin, there was no dialogue in the record 
between the defendant and the trial judge as to the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 
239, and the United States Supreme Court therefore 
concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights 
had been violated, id. at 243. 
5. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a two-
part test for determining plain error. State v. Eldr-
edge, 773 PJd 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 
5. Ct. 62 (1989). First, the error must be "plain,' 
which means "from our examination of the record, 
we must be able to say that it should have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing 
error." Id. at 35. Second, the error "must affect the 
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error 
be harmful." Id. See Also State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 
1336, 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was 
entered after the Gibbons case was decided. There-
fore, it should have been obvious to the thai judge 
that strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In 
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional 
rights were affected by this failure to strictly comply 
with Rule 11. 
6. In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial 
judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11. Smith, 
111 P.2d at 465. The court ruled that the test for 
complying with Rule 11 is the strict compliance test 
articulated in Gibbons. Id. The court then found 
that neither the plea bargain affidavit nor the trial 
judge clearly communicated that defendant would 
be required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence 
of five years. Id. 
7. In Valencia, the defendant entered his guilty plea 
after the Gibbons decision. The trial judge failed to 
review the contents of the affidavit with the defen-
dant. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. The court concl-
uded that the affidavit alone could not 'serve as a 
mere substitute for the full and complete review on 
the record by the trial court that is required by the 
rule." Id. Since the trial judge failed to comply with 
Rule 11, the court remanded to the trial court to 
allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. 
8. In Jolivet, the Utah Supreme Court applied the 
"record as a whole" test to Jolivet *s mouon to wit-
hdraw a guilty plea. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149. 
While the court does not give the date Jolivet 
entered his guilty plea or address the fact that the 
guilty plea had been entered prior to Gibbons, the 
Jolivet decision was the second appeal by the defe-
ndant, who had entered his guilty plea prior to the 
first appeal decided in 1986, before the decision in 
Gibbons. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 
1986). 
9. In Copeland, the defendant argued that the trial 
court failed to explain the nature and elements of 
the offense. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273. The court 
examined the record and found that the trial court 
had adequately explained the elements of the crime 
to the defendant. Id. Although the trial court did 
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not ate Hie preferred method of having the 
'defendant state m his own words his understanding 
of the offense and the actions which make him 
guilty of the crime/ id., the court found that the 
dements of the offense were clearly explained to 
defendant at the time of his arraignment and, ther-
efore, under the 'record as a whole* test, the plea 
was voluntary. Id. Once again, however, Oopeland 
entered his guilty plea before Gibbons was decided 
and although the court did not articulate this as a 
reason for applying the 'record as a whole' test, we 
assume this to be the case. 
If. Utah courts have refused to apply the Gibbons 
strict compliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty pleas. 
In Sute v. Vastiacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. 
App. 19S8), this court ruled that the Gibbons test 
did not apply since Vasilacopulos entered his guilty 
plea in 1984 before the Gibbons case was decided. Id. 
at 94. The court ruled that since the Gibbons 
test was a 'dear break with the past,' it would not 
be applied retroactively. Id. See Mho Suite v. 
Hickman, 779 PJd 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per 
curiam). 
11. The Gibbons court relied on McCarthy v. 
United StMtcs, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), where the 
United States Supreme Court stated that the factual 
elements of the charges must be explained so the 
defendant understand* those dements. Id. at 466. 
The Court concluded that "(tlhere is no adequate 
substitute for demonstrating in the record at the 
time the plea is entered the defendant's understan-
ding of the nature of the charge against him." Id. 
12. The State argues the affidavit is sufficient to 
apprise defendant of the allowable sentence. 
However, the affidavit signed by the defendant 
listed 'Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5' under the notation 
of 'Crime, Degree, and Punishment," but the affi-
davit did not include the term 'years' following '0-
5 . ' 
13. The Gibbons court stated that a judge may not 
use an affidavit to establish compliance with Rule 
11: 
It is not sufficient to assume that 
defense attorneys make sure that their 
clients fully understand the contents of 
the affidavit. 
The use of a sufficient affidavit can 
promote efficiency, but an affidavit 
should be only a starting point, not an 
end point, in the pleading process. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. 
The Utah Supreme Court's most recent opinion 
on this Gibbons issue is somewhat ambiguous. In 
State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), the court 
found that neither the affidavit nor the trial court 
clearly explained the possibility of a minimum 
mandatory sentence to the defendant. Id. at 465. 
The court concluded: "In order for defendant's 
guilty plea to be valid and in compliance with rule 
1 1(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and Stare v. Gibbons, the record must show that he 
was unequivocably and dearly informed about the 
sentence that would be imposed. Such evidence does 
not exist either in the affidavit regarding the plea 
bargain or in the transcript of the guilty plea. Thus, 
rule 11(e) and State v. Gibbons require the vacating 
of defendant's guilty plea on the ground that it was 
not knowingly and voluntarily made.' Id. at 466 
(emphasis added). 
Ote as 
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PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appel-
lant's motion for summary reversal for man-
ifest error, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10. 
In response, appellee filed a motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs motion for summary disposition, 
but did not file a response addressing the 
merits of appellant's motion. 
We first consider appellee's motion to 
dismiss appellant's motion. Appellee contends 
that the motion was untimely based on Rule 
10's requirement that a motion for summary 
disposition be filed within 10 days after the 
docketing statement is served. Appellant's 
docketing statement was served on July 9, 
1990, and her motion for summary disposition 
was filed on July 23, 1990. Appellant contends 
that because she served the docketing state-
ment by mail, she was entitled to an additional 
three days after service of the docketing stat-
ement in which to file a motion for summary 
reversal. See Utah R. App. P. 22(d). Although 
this three-day mailing rule is usually applied 
when the receiving party is required or perm-
itted to act after receipt of the document, it 
does not specifically exclude the present situ-
ation. It is unnecessary to rely upon the 
mailing rule, however, since Utah R. App. P. 
2 provides this court with the flexibility to 
suspend the requirements of Rule 10, on its 
own motion, where asuspension is "(i]n the 
interest of expediting a decision." Because we 
conclude that the motion is clearly meritorious 
and would thus support a suspension of Rule 
10's time limitation, we deny the motion to 
dismiss appellant's motion. 
The parties were divorced in 1985. Appel-
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
